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Abstract 
This article critically analyses the recent reinvigora-
tion of state capitalist economic strategies, guided by
neodevelopmentalist political thought, in Brazil and
Argentina. It makes use of analytical tools drawn
from materialist state theory and dependency per-
spectives to show how the chances, limits and con-
tradictions of these projects are shaped by the basic
dynamics of peripheral capitalism. Thus, while both
the Brazilian and Argentine state capitalist strategies
have been relatively successful on many counts, es-
pecially compared to the previously dominant ne-
oliberal paradigm, their social and economic balance
has remained ambiguous overall. While in the Bra-
zilian case there has been no fundamental break with
the historical pattern of exclusionary growth, Argen-
tina has achieved better social results, but at the price
of heightened political instability. Neither country 
has managed to overcome classical problems of de-
pendent development, such as a dependence on pri-
mary goods exports. 
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 Zusammenfassung 
Dieser Artikel untersucht kritisch das jüngste, durch 
neodesarrollistisches politisches Denken angeleitete 
Wiedererstarken staatskapitalistischer Wirtschafts-
strategien in Brasilien und Argentinien. Unter Ver-
wendung analytischer Werkzeuge aus materialisti-
scher Staatstheorie und Dependenzperspektiven zeigt 
er, inwiefern die Chancen, Grenzen und Widersprü-
che dieser Projekte durch die grundlegenden Dyna-
miken des peripheren Kapitalismus beeinflusst wer-
den. Obwohl sowohl der brasilianische als auch der 
argentinische Staatskapitalismus insbesondere im 
Vergleich zum zuvor dominanten neoliberalen Para-
digma in vielen Aspekten relativ erfolgreich waren, 
blieb ihre soziale und ökonomische Bilanz daher 
insgesamt widersprüchlich. Während im brasiliani-
schen Fall kein grundlegender Bruch mit dem histo-
rischen Muster ausschließenden Wachstums vollzo-
gen wurde, hat Argentinien bessere soziale Ergeb-
nisse erzielt, allerdings um den Preis höherer politi-
scher Instabilität. Keines der beiden Länder hat klas-
sische Probleme abhängiger Entwicklung, etwa die 
Abhängigkeit von Primärgüterexporten, überwinden 
können. 
 
Schlagworte: Staatskapitalismus, Neodesarrollismus, 
Brasilien, Argentinien, materialistische Staatstheorie, 
Dependenztheorie 
1. Introduction 
The recent resurgence of interest in ‘state capitalism’ stems from the perceived success of 
countries where, in contrast to what (neo-)liberal ideology and economic theory mandate, 
the state has either retained or regained a prominent role in steering the economy. Public 
and scholarly attention in the context of these debates has generally centred on the big 
emerging (‘BRICS’) economies which are seen as serious challengers to the traditional 
106 Matthias Ebenau/Victoria Liberatore 
core states’ dominance (see e.g. the emblematic special issue of The Economist, January 
2012). However, these are not the only cases where the state has returned to the economic 
centre stage. Indeed, in many Latin American countries left-of-centre governments, voted 
into office over the last fifteen years, have begun to implement state-centred strategies. 
This is reflected in changes in various fields of economic and social policy.  
In this article we seek to make a critical contribution to the debate by comparatively 
analysing the experiences of the two South American economic heavyweights, Brazil and 
Argentina, which have revived, after 2002, their particular state capitalist legacies under 
the programmatic heading of ‘neodevelopmentalism’. Elucidating the specificities of 
these countries’ respective variants of state capitalism can, in view of their distinct social 
foundations, contribute to shedding light on the diversity of the strategies commonly 
lumped together under this label. Moreover, the comparative perspective and the intro-
duction of the Argentine case enable us to reach a more rounded assessment of state capi-
talism beyond the oft-discussed large emerging economies. 
Theoretically, we seek to bring to bear insights associated with critical political econ-
omy perspectives which have had, so far, little presence in the new wave of debate. In 
contrast to the – often surprised and/or reluctant – admiration on the one hand, and a 
mainly liberal-inspired critique on the other (see e.g. Bremmer 2010; The Economist, 21 
January 2012) which have dominated the discussions, we believe that these approaches 
can help to illuminate a number of previously neglected aspects. In this vein, the article 
stresses particularly the social and ecological limits and the economic contradictions 
which the fundamental dynamics of peripheral capitalism impose on the political projects 
under consideration. 
The argument proceeds as follows: In the first section, we critically discuss the ne-
odevelopmentalist intellectual basis of the revival of state capitalism in Brazil and Argen-
tina. We then formulate a preliminary political economy critique and introduce some con-
ceptual tools from materialist state theory and dependency perspectives for the subsequent 
empirical evaluation, subject of the following two main sections. In the first of these, we 
present a comparative, historically grounded analysis of the Brazilian and Argentine ne-
odevelopmentalist projects. Following, we analyse their social and economic outcomes in 
a number of relevant dimensions. The conclusion signals the continued relevance of the 
basic dynamics of peripheral capitalism for analysing state capitalist strategies. 
2. Theoretical and conceptual considerations: a critical political 
economy perspective on neodevelopmentalist state capitalism 
Let us then first turn to a brief consideration of the theoretical and programmatic aspects 
of neodevelopmentalism, a body of political thought which sustains the present reinvigor-
ation of state-centred economic strategies in Brazil and Argentina. Of course there is, as 
always, no direct and complete correspondence between these ideas and the concrete po-
litical projects which are being pursued by the governments of the two countries in ques-
tion. Nevertheless, there is a close connection, implying that understanding the former 
will help to make sense of the latter, and, particularly, to identify the problems associated 
with both from a critical political economy viewpoint, which will be the purpose of the 
second part of this section (see Morais/Saad-Filho 2011a; Moreira Cunha/Ferrari 2009). 
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The core proposition of neodevelopmentalism, as set out by Luiz Carlos Bresser-
Pereira, is the need to elaborate and implement a political strategy which charts a path be-
tween the ‘populist’, state-centred and inward-looking ‘old’ (pre-1970s) developmental-
ism and the more recent (1980s/90s) but equally problematic market-centred, state-
disavowing and globalist neoliberalism (Bresser-Pereira 2007, 2010, chap. 3).1 The for-
mulation of such a strategy involves, on the one hand, a positive revaluation of the state’s 
(potential) role in fostering economic development; on the other hand, this revaluation 
needs to take into account the restrictions on state action and the higher and more com-
plex requirements for sustained national economic success emanating from the present-
day global context which, it is argued, essentially mandates open economy strategies 
(Boschi 2011; Bresser-Pereira 2010, chap. 1). Drawing on neo-Keynesian economics, 
Bresser-Pereira and other proponents of neodevelopmentalism present a specific solution 
to these challenges, namely the creation of a virtuous synthesis between ‘strong markets’ 
and a ‘strong state’. While the former are seen as necessary for creating a competitive en-
vironment and equality of opportunities for firms and consumers alike, the latter is re-
quired to effectively regulate these markets, in order to guarantee their appropriate func-
tioning. The desired outcome is, firstly, dynamic economic growth, based on technologi-
cal progress and increased international competitiveness of nationally-based firms; and 
secondly, an equitable distribution of the resulting rent, making the growth socially inclu-
sive (Boschi/Gaitán 2009; Bresser-Pereira 2007, 2010, chap. 2; Sicsú et al. 2005). 
In more specific terms, then, the neodevelopmentalist thinkers assign the state a num-
ber of core functions, including: firstly, to provide competent and efficient bureaucracy 
and institutions that count with sufficient political and fiscal leeway (Bresser-Pereira 
2007); secondly, to support firms’ international competitiveness and to push them towards 
greater internationalisation to make sure support will be converted into efficiency gains 
(Boschi 2011; Bresser-Pereira 2010, chap. 1 & 4; Sicsú et al. 2005); thirdly, to guarantee 
a ‘competitive’ and stable macroeconomic environment, not least through managing the 
international exchange rate in a way so as to foster exports (Bresser-Pereira 2010, chap. 4 
& 5; Sicsú et al. 2005); fourthly, to ensure that growth is ‘inclusive’ by means of a ‘just’ 
distribution of the rents expected to flow from increased competitiveness (Boschi/Gaitán 
2009; Gaitán 2011); finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, to politically ‘manage’ 
economic development by building a ‘national development project’ with the support of 
all the relevant social and economic actors (Boschi 2011; Boschi/Gaitán 2009; Bresser-
Pereira 2010, chap. 2). 
From a critical political economy perspective, the neodevelopmentalist proposal 
seems potentially problematic in at least two respects. The first refers to the optimism re-
garding the potentials for and the benefits of state-led capitalist development inherent to 
the neodevelopmentalist proposals. Critical political economy approaches tend to be 
much more sceptical in this regard, since they understand capitalism as a mode of produc-
tion which is premised upon an exploitative and conflictive relationship between socio-
economic classes. This conflict can be institutionally mitigated, but never be obviated 
completely and/or over the longer run (see e.g. Bruff 2011; Jessop 2002, chap. 1).  
How does this reflect upon the neodevelopmentalist programme of state capitalism? 
For one, it calls into question its focus on systemic competitiveness and the postulated se-
quence between the successes of individual firms, nationally conceived economic growth, 
and generalised socio-economic wellbeing. Instead, critical political economy perspec-
tives point to the non-congruence of business success and social development. This ex-
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presses itself mainly in the displacement of the social and ecological costs that the quest 
for competitiveness produces for vulnerable groups of people and for nature (see e.g. 
Gudynas 2010). Secondly the capitalist state cannot be conceived of as an autonomous 
subject that somehow stands above class conflict and can thus articulate a ‘higher’ ration-
ality of national development. Rather, it is to be seen as embedded within and, indeed, 
constituted by the conflictive interplay of social forces, and therein as structurally de-
pendent on the reproduction of capital. This implies that the supposed national develop-
ment projects and the underlying (re-)configuration of state apparatuses, despite the asso-
ciated hegemonic rhetoric, will remain the expression of particular interests linked to a 
politico-economic alliance which includes some and excludes other groups to varying de-
grees (Ebenau/Suau Arinci 2012; Féliz/López 2012, sec. 5.IV). 
A second, if in its implications closely related, problem with the neodevelopmentalist 
programme stems from its attempt to adapt national-developmentalist strategies to the 
open economy conditions of globalised capitalism. The neodevelopmentalist position im-
plies a principled insistence on the permanence of sufficient political and economic lee-
way for individual states’ governments to make this a potentially viable endeavour. In 
contrast, critical political economists emphasise the restrictions that the (semi-)peripheral 
context generates (see e.g. Domingues 2010; Fernández/Alfaro 2011). 
Again, what does this mean for a critical view on Latin American neodevelopmental-
ism? Principally, it implies that social, political, and economic processes have to be un-
derstood as results of the interplay between factors that appear ‘internal’ and others that 
appear ‘external’ to specific territories. For countries in a (semi-)peripheral position in the 
world economy, the ‘external’ factors tend to have far greater weight than for the capital-
ist core states. Among the reasons for this are, to name but a few, a generalised scarcity of 
investment capital, the fragility of endogenous productive capacities, and a subordinated 
embeddedness within transnational regulatory regimes (Dicken 2011, chap. 7). In pro-
nounced cases, the governments of peripheral countries will therefore have very little 
leeway for pursuing the neodevelopmentalist ideal of a national, state-led project. Often 
therefore, critical political economists argue, the above-mentioned structural dynamics of 
the capitalist mode of production – in particular the generation of high social and ecologi-
cal costs – will play out in a much less mitigated, potentially more harmful way in (semi-) 
peripheral contexts (Harvey 2003, chap. 4). 
To reach a critical evaluation of the chances, limits and contradictions of neodevel-
opmentalist state capitalism in Brazil and Argentina, against the background of the above 
considerations, two analytical concepts seem particularly helpful. The first is the notion of 
the state as ‘the specific material condensation of a relationship of forces among classes 
and class fractions’, originally derived from the work of Nicos Poulantzas (2000, p. 129, 
italics original). This critical-materialist understanding provides an alternative to neode-
velopmentalism’s rather idealistic notion of the state. In principle, thus, the state has to be 
understood as overdetermined by a more fundamental conjunction of social forces. At the 
same time, since the interplay of these forces is structurally conflictive, the state as an en-
semble of institutions can acquire a ‘relational autonomy’ vis-à-vis societal actors. This 
form of autonomy depends, however, not primarily on some kind of intrinsic institutional 
quality, but on the kinds and degrees of political leeway which state elites can draw from 
the specific dynamics of social forces. Over time, different state apparatuses acquire their 
own ‘strategic selectivities’, i.e. patterns of relative openness or closure for social groups 
and their interests (Jessop 2002, chap. 1; Poulantzas 2000, sec. 3.1). 
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The second analytical concept that we want to introduce is that of ‘dependent devel-
opment’, a notion explicated by Gereffi/Evans (1981, pp. 31-32) against the background 
of more than a decade of debates about the dependency of the so-called Third World. The 
term, in these authors’ understanding, designates the fact that, on the one hand, economic 
dynamism, diversification of the productive structure, and social progress are well possi-
ble in (semi-)peripheral contexts; but that, on the other hand, these processes remain cir-
cumscribed by the dynamics in the cores of the world economy. Thereby – far from a 
mere mechanistic overdetermination – ‘external’ factors inscribe themselves into ‘inter-
nal’ social relationships (Cardoso/Faletto 1983, sec. II.5). Classic expressions of depend-
ent development include economic dominance of foreign companies, especially in the 
leading productive sectors; a persistent insertion of local activities into the lower, socially 
and economically less promising segments of the global production networks articulated 
by these TNCs; and the adoption of a ‘dependent’ attitude by domestic capitalists, who 
often come to function as mere middlemen between the local and the global economy. 
These concepts provide the frame for the following critical interrogation of state capi-
talism in Brazil and Argentina. In this sense, the following sections analyse particularly 
the connections between the specific dynamics of social forces and the fundamental char-
acter and historical trajectories of the respective developmental states, as well as the 
shared but differential conditioning effects of the (semi)peripheral global position of the 
Brazilian and Argentine economies. 
3. Neodevelopmentalist state capitalism in Brazil and Argentina 
As is well known, over the course of the 1990s, proponents of neoliberalism sought to roll 
back the dominant state capitalist economic strategies – the ‘old’ developmentalism – 
throughout all of Latin America. The concrete ways in which neoliberalisation processes 
played out and their results strongly depended, however, on the specific subregional and 
national contexts. These specificities, in turn, constitute the context for the emergence of 
‘new’ neodevelopmentalist state capitalisms in Brazil, Argentina and elsewhere. This sec-
tion analyses the respective legacies of the ‘old’ developmentalism in Brazil and Argenti-
na, the character and effects of their neoliberalisation processes, and, embedded within 
these considerations, the social contours and the policies characteristic of their particular 
variants of today’s neodevelopmentalist state capitalism. 
Brazil: the state capitalist path dependency 
A historical perspective on the Brazilian case points toward the long-standing dominance 
of state capitalist economic strategies. From the 1930s onwards, diverse governments 
with a developmentalist orientation – including those of Vargas, Kubitschek, Goulart and, 
in a clearly authoritarian fashion, the military dictatorship which came to power in the 
mid-1960s – established the basis for what might be called a fundamental state capitalist 
path dependency in 20th century Brazilian political economy. For present purposes, three 
specific characteristics of that path dependency can be highlighted; jointly, these consti-
tute the legacy of Brazil’s ‘old’ state capitalism for today’s neo-developmentalism: firstly, 
a relatively successful import-substituting industrialisation leading to the emergence of a 
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significant domestic and more or less ‘state-friendly’ industrial bourgeoisie (Marini 2008 
[1966]; Schneider 2004: chap. 4); secondly, as a result of this intra-bourgeois differentia-
tion, a higher relational autonomy for state elites which facilitated the centralisation and 
consolidation of state capacities and permitted significant institutional reforms, including 
the creation of the forerunner of oil giant Petrobras and of the development bank BNDES 
(de Oliveira 2006); and thirdly, these successes notwithstanding, the extreme socio-spatial 
exclusivity of Brazilian developmentalism, as expressed in Brazil’s early-1970s Gini co-
efficient of 68.4, the highest ever measured for Latin America (Cornia 2012, table 1; 
Leubolt/Tittor 2008). 
From the 1980s onwards, the developmentalist strategy was superseded, after a pro-
tracted period of crisis and transition, by a neoliberal-inspired policy shift, put into prac-
tice mainly by the Collor de Mello (1990-92) and Cardoso governments (1995-2002). The 
most important changes included the sell-off of practically all state-owned manufacturing 
enterprises; the restriction of monetary sovereignty through the creation of the Plano Real 
which, to combat hyperinflation, established a flexible peg of the national currency to the 
US dollar; a far-reaching opening for foreign trade in the context of Brazil’s WTO acces-
sion, as well as a liberalisation of foreign investment rules; and a reduction of the state’s 
functions in welfare provision (for a fuller discussion see Schmalz/Ebenau 2011, sec. 3.2). 
Still, there were important limitations to Brazilian neoliberalisation, which point to the 
continued importance of the state capitalist legacy. Among them were the cautious, nego-
tiated and incomplete nature of the privatisation process; the retention of state control 
over strategic enterprises such as Petrobras; policy initiatives to counteract the liberalisa-
tion-induced deindustrialisation; and the emphasis placed on softening some of the social 
impacts of economic restructuring (Ban 2013; Leubolt/Tittor 2008; Natanson 2010). 
The neoliberalisation project ran into trouble with the international financial turbu-
lence beginning in 1998 which led to the abolition of the Plano Real and, consequently, a 
currency devaluation. This trouble facilitated, belatedly, the election of Lula da Silva, the 
leader of the socialist-turned-social democratic opposition party Partido dos Tra-
balhadores (PT) for president. While policy changes during Lula’s first term (2003-6) 
remained limited in reach due to continuing conflicts between different ‘axes’ within the 
government, his re-election for a second term (2007-10) led to a more decisive reinvigora-
tion of the state capitalist legacy in a wider array of policy fields (Schmalz/Ebenau 2011, 
sec. 3.2.3). 
For the most part, the policies implemented by Lula’s and his chosen successor Dilma 
Roussef’s (since 2011) administrations are in consonance with the neodevelopmentalist 
proposal. For one, after Lula’s re-election the government began to recover an activist 
economic stance, the clearest manifestation of this being the implementation of a massive 
infrastructure investment programme, the Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento 
(PAC, 2007-10, worth ca. R$ 504/US$ 236 billion), later followed by a PAC II with an 
even higher volume (2011-14, ca. R$ 959/US$ 525 billion) (Comitê Gestor do PAC 2007, 
2012). 
Another area where substantial changes took place was that of social and labour poli-
cies. In the area of social support, the government integrated and partly expanded the ne-
oliberal-inspired conditional cash transfer programmes, culminating in the creation of the 
Bolsa Familia conditional income support programme. It did not, however, break with the 
‘target-specificity’ ideal of neoliberal-inspired social policy (Ban 2013; Leubolt/Tittor 
2008). The statutory minimum wage, in turn, was increased to R$ 678 (US$ 333) as of 
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January 2013, implying an increase of about 70% in real terms (O Globo, 24 December 
2012).2 
With regards to state ownership of enterprises, as hinted at above, many strategic en-
terprises – their number standing at 247 in 2010 – had never been privatised. What is 
more, the government had retained significant shares of an even larger number – 397, in 
2010 – of nominally private companies and thus influence over them (Musacchio/ 
Lazzarini 2012, table 2). In line with the neodevelopmentalist approach, the successive 
PT administrations have taken to exercising a more active influence than their predeces-
sors over these firms’ business decisions.3 On the incentive side, they created relatively 
successful programmes for supporting research and development, and a fund to assist the 
internationalisation of Brazil’s growing group of translatinas (Casanova Seuma 2011; 
Musacchio/Lazzarini 2012). 
Concerning the macroeconomic strategy, fiscal policy, despite its significant expansion, 
remained conditioned by the imperative of attaining a primary surplus; a posture which was 
only temporarily abandoned in the context of the 2008-9 crisis. While this is in accordance 
with neodevelopmentalist recommendations, in other areas of macroeconomic management, 
there have been significant deviations. Thus, in accordance with neoliberal economic theo-
ry, the central bank has kept its mandate restricted to inflation targeting, and has maintained 
high nominal interest rates to incentivise capital inflows. The exchange rate, too, was main-
tained at overvalued levels (Ban 2013; Morais/Saad-Filho 2011b). 
In sum, the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s did not break fundamentally with Brazil’s 
state capitalist path dependency. Brazilian neodevelopmentalism under Lula and Dilma 
can therefore be understood as a reinvigoration of the statist tradition which builds strong-
ly on the institutional legacy of the old developmentalism. 
Argentina: from the neoliberal counterrevolution to 
neodevelopmentalism 
Argentina’s economic history over the second half of the 20th century was characterised 
by the vying for hegemony between a liberal, outward-oriented project and its national-
developmentalist rival, the latter being associated principally with the Peronist political 
movement. The continuing contestation between these two projects gave Argentine politi-
cal economy a much more conflictive character than was the case in neighbouring Brazil. 
In comparison with Brazil’s state capitalist path dependency, several important differ-
ences must be noted. Firstly, the efforts to broaden and diversify the industrial basis un-
dertaken by several governments of a developmentalist inclination were less successful 
and the economic and political weight of the conservative rural bourgeoisie remained 
higher than in Brazil (Basualdo 2006). As a result and secondly, the nevertheless signifi-
cant relational autonomy of state elites vis-à-vis capital depended much more on the mo-
bilisation of the popular classes, leaving the state’s institutions susceptible to repeated 
radical policy changes (Gaitán 2012). Thirdly, historical Peronism represented a more 
radical and inclusive variant of developmentalism and the Argentine working classes ben-
efited to a much greater extent from the phases of economic dynamism than in the Brazil-
ian case (Natanson 2010). 
Carlos Menem’s, nominally Peronist, governments (1989-99), which led a deep-
reaching neoliberalisation process, therefore constituted the culmination of previous at-
112 Matthias Ebenau/Victoria Liberatore 
tempts to dismantle the developmental state. Using decree powers, Menem mandated the 
liberalisation of foreign trade and investment as well as the far-reaching relaxation of la-
bour market rules, and he drastically cut public expenditure levels. Also, his government 
adopted a most radical recipe to combat inflation by establishing a rigid one-to-one peg of 
the Argentine peso to the US dollar. Almost all state-owned enterprises were privatised, 
passing to the hands of a limited number of domestic business groups and, particularly in 
the profitable utilities sector, transnational companies. One of the main consequences of 
economic opening, privatisation and liberalisation was a severe deindustrialisation (North 
2007; Teubal 2004). Argentine neoliberalisation is often taken to represent the most radi-
cal expression of this ideology in Latin America. Thus, in contrast to the more moderate 
strategy implemented in neighbouring Brazil, it virtually obliterated the institutional lega-
cy of the ‘old’ developmentalism (Gaitán 2012; Moreira Cunha/Ferrari 2009). 
The knock-on effects of the 1998 international crisis and, in particular, of the Brazili-
an devaluation triggered an economic and social downward spiral which gave way to the 
politico-institutional crisis of 2001-2. The latter led to the election of Néstor Kirchner 
(2003-7), representative of a more traditional variant of Peronism. Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner, his wife, succeeded him as president and was re-elected in 2011. Their govern-
ments, jointly denominated ‘Kirchnerist’, presided over a return to a state-centred strategy 
which, in many respects, resembles Brazilian neodevelopmentalism, but with important 
differences in its institutional foundations and specific political priorities.  
Without doubt the paradigm-defining policy changes were undertaken in the macroe-
conomic field, most prominently through the abolition of the convertibility regime, as 
recommended by neodevelopmentalist thinkers. Subsequently, the Kirchner government 
adopted a regime of exchange rate management to maintain ‘competitive’ (export-
oriented) levels. Initial, low interest rates meant that monetary policy was geared toward 
fostering investment and job creation. Faced with soaring inflation, however, from 2007 
onwards the central bank raised interest rates above Brazilian levels (Gaitán 2012; Varesi 
2010). 
A further significant change was the implementation of an expansive fiscal policy, as 
the government began to widen both the tax base and public spending, in particular for in-
frastructure development, subsidies to public services, and social policy (Neffa 2010). 
Like in Brazil, however, the rate of fiscal expansion remained conditioned by the goal of 
attaining a primary surplus and serving the remaining public debt (Macías Vázquez 2008). 
A noteworthy feature of the fiscal regime is the way it channels the rents flowing into the 
agricultural sector via the so-called retenciones, an export tax on an array of primary 
products, into increasing the fiscal leeway for the neodevelopmentalist project. This con-
struction, while serving its primary purpose, is also one of the chief reasons for the con-
tinued discontent of the agricultural bourgeoisie (Basualdo 2008). 
The successive integration and extension of social protection programmes ultimately 
led to the creation of the Asignación Universal por Hijo, through which an amount of 
presently A$ 270 (ca. US$ 60) monthly is paid to more than 4.5 million families. Another 
important development was the renationalisation of the pensions system, in 2009, fol-
lowed by a substantial increase in minimum pensions. The minimum wage was revived as 
a policy instrument and raised to A$ 2,875 (580 US$) by February 2013. This implies a 
fourfold increase in real terms, assuming official inflation figures.4 Also, the number of 
collective agreements in the formal sector has grown exponentially, from around 200 per 
year during the 1990s to between 1,800 and 2,000 in 2010 and 2011 (METySS 2011). 
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Overall, the strengthening of social and labour policy in Argentina has been considerably 
more ambitious than in Brazil, reflecting the more immediate need to maintain popular 
mobilisation in favour of Kirchnerism, especially in the agitated earlier post-crisis years. 
Finally, as part of the turn to a neodevelopmentalist economic strategy, the admin-
istrations of Kirchner and Fernández began to buy back some privatised firms including, 
in 2012, the energy giant YPF. Generally, however, the level of direct and indirect state 
control over the big business sector remains very low if compared to Brazil or, indeed, 
many European countries (Gaitán 2012; Neffa 2010). Also, policy initiatives were under-
taken to foster firms’ innovative activity, export competitiveness and management capaci-
ties, but the respective spending levels remain considerably below those of Brazil and the 
existing institutions are still quite segmented (Baruj et al. 2009). 
In summary, state capitalism in Argentina has been part of a much more volatile and 
contested historical conjuncture than in Brazil. This is reflected in Argentina’s present-
day state capitalism: firstly, it builds on a weaker productive and institutional basis; sec-
ondly, it is embedded into a political economy characterised by higher degrees of social 
mobilisation and conflict (see also Gago/Sztulwark 2009). The following section now 
turns to a comparative evaluation of the economic and social performance of the Brazilian 
and Argentine variants of neodevelopmentalist state capitalism. 
4. Brazilian and Argentine state capitalism on the balance sheet 
In what follows, we discuss six central areas of social and economic performance: eco-
nomic growth; export competitiveness; investment and the internationalisation of domes-
tic firms; incomes, employment, poverty and inequality; socio-ecological problems; and 
social support, contradictions and conflicts. This selection takes into account both the 
success parameters posited by neodevelopmentalist thinkers and the objections of the crit-
ical political economy perspectives introduced above. In this sense, the following com-
parative discussion seeks to analytically relate the empirical data to the specific changes 
in the relations between social forces, and to the concrete forms of expression of depend-
ent development. 
Economic growth  
Both Argentina and Brazil have, over the past ten years or so, gone through a phase of ex-
traordinary economic dynamism, reflected in the high GDP growth rates which have 
marked a clear break relative to the neoliberal period. Against this background, both 
countries were also able to withstand the international recession of 2009 comparatively 
well. This was a result, in part, of the deployment of Keynesian-inspired anti-cyclical pol-
icies in both countries (ILO 2010a, 2010b). Figure 1 charts the annual GDP growth in the 
two countries. 
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Figure 1: Annual GDP growth, 1991-2011 
 
 
Significantly, Argentine GDP growth has been consistently higher over the last decade, 
standing at 8.8% on average for 2003-7 and 6.5% for 2008-11, compared to Brazil’s 4.0 
and 3.8% over the same sub-periods. As for the drivers of economic growth, the picture 
diverges between the two countries. In Brazil (2003-11), the manufacturing industry ex-
panded at a below-average rate, while construction and utilities provision – the activities 
principally targeted by the PAC programmes – had the highest growth rates among the 
major sectors, followed by agriculture. Mining grew by far the fastest of all productive ac-
tivities, skyrocketing from very low (<1%) levels to a share of 3.5% of GDP in 2011. In 
Argentina, by contrast, the most dynamic among the major productive sectors were con-
struction and the manufacturing industry.5 
The most general conclusion to be drawn from these figures is a strong vindication of 
the neodevelopmentalist economic strategies in terms of their capacity to generate eco-
nomic growth. While the favourable international situation has clearly played an im-
portant role, the composition of GDP growth signals that the expansion of domestic mar-
kets, related to increased public spending, has been an even more significant factor, par-
ticularly in the Argentine case. Another notable result is the dynamism of Argentina’s, 
compared to Brazil’s growth rates. This trend, which has proved more durable than just 
initial crisis-recovery effects, is somewhat at odds with a widespread perception of Brazil 
representing the more successful variant of neodevelopmentalism. 
Export competitiveness 
Despite the dynamism of economic sectors such as construction and manufacturing, if we 
focus on the internationally competitive economic activities, the primary goods sector – 
mainly agriculture and mineral extraction –returns to the spotlight. Strikingly, in the Bra-
zilian case, the growth of primary exports has far surpassed that for manufactures, leading 
to a marked rise of the share of the former within total values, from 47.4% in 2002 to 
63.6% in 2010. Also in this regard, mining has been by far the most dynamic segment. 
The trend for Argentina over the same period was somewhat different, with the value 
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share of primary products declining very slightly. Still, at 67.8% (down from 69.5%), the 
historical preponderance of primary exports remains unbroken.  
What is more, in both cases internationally competitive activities are generally of low 
technology intensity. Figures 2 and 3 give an overview over the technological content of 
the 15 principal export products for Brazil and Argentina, respectively. Thereby, the col-
ours of the columns represent the four categories of the OECD’s STAN industry classifi-
cation (white = low, light grey = medium-low, dark grey = medium-high and black = high 
technology intensity).6 
 
Figure 1: Technology intensity of Brazil’s 15 principal export products, 2010 
  
Figure 3:  Technology intensity of Argentina’s 15 principal export products, 2010 
 
 
It becomes immediately apparent that goods with high or medium-high technology inten-
sity have only an extremely limited presence among the major exports both of Brazil and 
Argentina. Across all exports, the participation of high-tech goods is somewhat higher for 
Brazil, at 11%, than for Argentina, at 7%. Significantly, the biggest contributor to the 
group of more technology-intensive exports, in both countries, is the automobile sector. 
This means that the significance of these figures must be further qualified, due to the high 
and persistent import-dependency of these activities, which signals a weak interlinking, 
especially in the case of Argentina, of assembly with domestic components industries, the 
guarantors of job creation and technology spill-over effects (Cantarella et al. 2008). 
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In summary, these figures show that the international commercial insertion of both 
countries under study has so far remained firmly within the parameters of dependent de-
velopment, where (semi-)peripheral territories constitute providers of primary materials 
and, at best, basic industrial commodities. There are some differences in degree, reflecting 
Brazil’s historically stronger industrial basis and its relatively greater recent success at 
technological capacity-building. Still, the striking re-primarisation of the composition of 
this country’s exports and the comparatively low proportion of high-technology products 
– not only relative to the traditional core economies, but also to other emerging countries 
such as China – signal that neodevelopmentalist state capitalism is still far from bringing 
about a fundamental repositioning in the world economy for either Argentina or Brazil. 
Investment and the internationalisation of domestic firms 
The evolution of international investment has been quite distinct for both cases. Inward 
FDI stock in Brazil has increased almost sevenfold since 2002, to US$ 669.7 billion in 
2011, while its share of GDP has risen from under 20% to around 30%. In the Argentine 
case, accumulated FDI stock reached a mere US$ 95.1 billion in 2011, a share of GDP of 
just over 20%, after a slow recovery from the 2001-2 crisis.7 Still, foreign capitals remain 
highly influential in the Argentine big business sector; in 2009, among the 500 biggest lo-
cal firms, 324 counted with complete or majority foreign ownership.8 Significantly, rela-
tive to the 1990s and in both in the Brazilian and the Argentine cases, the main target sec-
tors of inward FDI have shifted toward the increasingly dynamic sectors of agriculture, 
extractive activities and related manufacturing.9 As a result, especially among the interna-
tionally competitive activities discussed in the last subsection, large shares of revenue ac-
crue to extra-regional TNCs, e.g. 29% for metals and mining, 42% for food and beverag-
es, 74% for agricultural commodities and 94% for the automobile sector.10  
Brazil’s accumulated outward FDI stock has almost quadrupled after Lula’s election, 
reaching US$ 202.6 billion in 2011, while its weight as a share of GDP has increased con-
siderably since the mid-1990s, to between 8% and 10% over the last years. Argentina’s 
outward FDI has also increased, but at a much more moderate pace, to US$ 31.3 billion in 
2011, 7% of GDP.11 As for the internationalisation of domestic firms, in 2007 Brazil 
counted with 34 companies among the 100 biggest Latin American transnationals, many 
of them active in the traditional core states, compared to a mere 7 from Argentina (BCG 
2009; see also Nölke’s contribution to this special issue). 
These marked differences in outward investment and the internationalisation of firms, 
in conclusion, arguably reflect – beyond obvious issues of economic scale – the stronger 
institutional basis for the Brazilian ‘national champions’ strategy. Still, despite the aston-
ishment which the appearance of Brazilian TNCs in Europe and North America has 
caused among some observers, the more general figures on investment show clearly that 
both the Brazilian and Argentine economies are still much more strongly subjected to the 
interests of foreign corporations than firms from these countries have been able to reach 
out to other territories. Coupled with the fact that the lion’s share of foreign investment 
continues to flow into the essentially extraction-based mining and agricultural sectors and 
the oligopolistic and weakly embedded automobile industry, this shows that another fun-
damental axis of dependent development remains firmly in place. 
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Incomes, employment, poverty and inequality 
What about the social side of the neodevelopmentalist economic strategies of Brazil and 
Argentina? Figure 4 maps the evolution of gross national income (GNI) per capita, ad-
justed for purchasing power.  
 
Figure 4:  Gross national income (adjusted for purchasing power) per capita (in US$) 
 and income inequality (Gini coefficient), 1990, 1995, 2000-1112 
 
 
Obviously, both countries’ per capita incomes have risen considerably since 2002, where-
by Argentine growth rates have been much higher than those of Brazil, making the former 
once again the richest country in the region.  
Real average wages in Brazil suffered a decline in the years after the 1998 crisis, fol-
lowed by a gradual recovery from 2003 onwards. Still, in 2011 they had not regained their 
pre-crisis levels. In Argentina, real wages apparently recovered so vigorously from the 
2001-2 crisis that in 2011 they had more than doubled relative to 2000.13 These figures 
are questionable, however, since they rely on official inflation measures – 9.1% annually 
on average from 2003-11 – which according to many critics severely underestimate the 
actual rate. The think tank CIFRA, sponsored by the dissident trade union confederation 
CTA, estimates the inflation figures for 2007 up until the first half of 2012 to fluctuate 
around 20% annually. Assuming these data to be more adequate implies that the current 
real wage gains represent merely a recovery of historical, pre-neoliberalisation levels. In 
any case, the recovery has been highly segmented, with unregistered workers and public 
employees lagging behind the development in the formal private sector (CIFRA-CTA 
2011, 2012; see also Féliz/López 2012, sec. 7.V). 
As for the employment record of neodevelopmentalism, the picture is similarly am-
biguous. Open unemployment has been reduced in both countries, in Brazil, moderately 
from 11.1% in 2003 to 9.2% in 2009, in Argentina, after the crisis-induced explosion of 
unemployment, from 17.9% in 2002 to 7.7% in 2010.14 However, a figure which in both 
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cases calls into question an all-too positive evaluation of these trends is the continued rel-
evance of the informal sector which, according to CEPAL data, still accounts for 41% of 
urban employment in Brazil (2009) and 39% in Argentina (2010), both figures only 
slightly down from their values at the start of the millennium.15 
Fields where substantial advances have been made are those of income inequality, 
captured in Figure 4, above, and poverty reduction. Brazil’s Gini coefficient, stagnant at a 
very high value of about 60 throughout most of the 1990s, declined substantially to 54.7 
points in 2009. The country’s poverty headcount has come down from 21% in the early 
2000s to 10.8% in 2009. The inequality trend in Argentina, in turn, has reversed, after ris-
ing markedly in the context of neoliberalisation and its terminal crisis. Since then, it has 
declined by more than 10 points to 44.5 in 2010, so that Argentina now has again one of 
the lowest degrees of income inequality regionally. The same is true for poverty which, at 
1.9% in 2010, has declined again to the very low pre-neoliberalisation levels.16 
In sum, although in both countries considerable social improvements have been 
achieved, even if we take a cautious stance regarding the accuracy of official statistics, the 
evolution of Argentine social and labour indicators over the last decade has been much 
more positive than that of Brazil. Argentina has recovered its relatively high real incomes, 
as well as low poverty and inequality levels, making its population once again the richest 
of the region in terms of purchasing power. The Kirchner and Fernández governments 
have thus retaken and strengthened the more socially inclusive legacy of Argentine state 
capitalism. While the social advances made in the Brazilian case are substantial, especial-
ly considering the historical entrenchment of poverty and inequality, it is certainly still too 
early to speak of a rupture of the historical pattern of exclusionary growth given that in-
come levels are just average for Latin America and the inequality rate is among the high-
est. 
Socio-ecological problems 
Both Brazil and Argentina have in recent years seen a surge of environmental and territo-
rial conflicts and associated protests, signalling the problematic socio-ecological balance 
of neodevelopmentalism.17 One of the key reasons for this is the expansion of extractive 
activities such as mining, especially in Brazil, and of monocultural agricultural production 
in both countries. The unimpressive environmental track record of these activities – high 
contamination levels, accelerated soil depletion etc. – is well documented, and both are 
known to have produced large-scale displacements of rural communities (Giarracca 
2010; Teubal 2006).  
In Brazil, there have also been protests against a series of large infrastructure devel-
opment projects associated with the PAC programmes, throwing into relief their often 
ambiguous environmental implications (see e.g. Fearnside/Laurance 2012). In Argentina, 
concerns have grown, among other things, about a process of displacement of ‘non-
competitive’ small producers by the advance of large-scale soy production. This process 
would, according to its critics, force parts of the rural population to abandon their tradi-
tional territories and occupations (Paz 2008). 
Of course, these trends are not exclusive to neodevelopmentalist strategies. However, 
the fact that in Brazil, Argentina and other Latin American countries with left-of-centre 
governments they proceed essentially in the same way as in their less ‘progressive’ coun-
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terparts indicates that neodevelopmentalism is all but exempt from the harmful dynamics 
of peripheral capitalism. Indeed, for both countries in question the lion’s share of exports 
and of the resulting rents, including taxes necessary for ensuring the fiscal and social via-
bility of the neodevelopmentalist projects, are directly linked to a growth in mining, the 
extraction of hydrocarbons and agriculture. In Argentina, for instance, between 2002 and 
2011 about 10% to 15% of all collected taxes resulted from the retenciones levied on the 
exports of associated products (DNIAF 2011). Thus, the predominant form of use of na-
ture under neodevelopmentalism has been characterised as one of ‘progressive extractiv-
ism’ which seeks to appropriate a greater proportion of the resulting rents for a ‘compen-
satory state’, but which does not transcend the ecologically unsustainable mode of de-
pendent development (Gudynas 2012).  
Social support, contradictions and conflicts 
In Brazil, from the fragile alliance which had made Lula’s first victory possible emerged a 
rather solid social bloc which comprises capitals of domestic origin, in particular those 
that benefit from the strategic alliance with the state; transnational capital fractions which 
continue to encounter favourable conditions in Brazil; as well as organised workers and 
parts of the marginal population which are being integrated by means of mild redistribu-
tion. The latter, however, do not play a protagonist role, as the degree of actual social mo-
bilisation has remained low. Rather, the successive PT governments have opted for a 
gradualist strategy, limiting pace and scope of the realisation of democratic and distribu-
tive aims, as is reflected in the figures just reviewed (Morais/Saad-Filho 2005, 2011a). 
Still, until now this social alliance has been quite successful in organising political sup-
port, as is expressed in the very high approval rates which both Lula (especially in his last 
years in office) and Dilma enjoy(ed), and the latter’s secure triumph in the 2010 ballots 
(Schmalz/Ebenau 2012). However, the growing ecological contradictions of the neode-
velopmentalist project did not leave the political coalition supporting it unaffected: in 
2008, Lula’s minister of the environment, Marina Silva, resigned over a dispute regarding 
the importance of environmental protection; she later left the PT and stood for Brazil’s 
Partido Verde in the 2010 presidential elections, gaining 19.3% of votes (da Veiga 2009). 
The social bloc that supports Kirchnerism in Argentina seems, on the face of it, quite 
similar to its Brazilian counterpart and, until 2011, has been just as successful in electoral 
terms. It is constituted by industrial capital fractions, both domestic and transnational, and 
has (re-)integrated organised labour as well as parts of the marginalised population and of 
the middle classes (Orovitz Sanmartino 2009). But the latter have played a much more ac-
tive part in driving forward the neodevelopmentalist project as is expressed, for instance, 
in the level of labour unrest: the number of strikes and lockouts, 804 in 2008, while lower 
than during the crisis-ridden years of neoliberalism, was still almost twice as high as in 
(much bigger) Brazil.18 
Faced with demands by firms, in recent years, the Fernández administration has in-
creasingly imposed wage caps on collective agreements to keep increases coupled to 
productivity gains. This policy, in conjunction with permitting high levels of price-driven 
inflation and keeping the peso undervalued vis-à-vis the US dollar, seems to succeed for 
the moment at maintaining profitability at levels acceptable to capital, but at the price of 
limiting further social improvements (Féliz/López 2012, chap. 7). This is leading to a 
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growing alienation of sectors of organised labour, as becomes clear, for instance, in the 
emergence of Peronist trade union leader Hugo Moyano as one of the main opposition 
figures (El Clarín, 15 September 2012). On the other hand, the imposition of price and 
export controls on the agricultural sector and the retenciones-based transfer of resource 
rents into the expansion of domestic markets have deepened the confrontation with the ru-
ral bourgeoisie, erupting into a major open conflict in 2008 (Basualdo 2008; Ebenau/ 
Suau Arinci 2012). It remains still to be seen whether this situation of confrontation will 
lead to major electoral changes in the future; the president’s approval rates, for one, have 
fallen from 69% at the moment of her re-election to a mere 39% in late 2012 (The 
Economist, 5 January 2013). 
In sum, the comparison shows how the neodevelopmentalist political projects in Bra-
zil and Argentina remain beset by the fundamental class contradictions of (peripheral) 
capitalism. Thus, the political stability of Brazil’s present-day variant of state capitalism 
comes at the price of preserving its stronger exclusionary character, while its more social-
ly inclusive Argentine counterpart is marked by a far higher degree of social conflictivity. 
This requires an increasingly precarious balancing act between attending to the demands 
of the working classes and keeping the traditional right-wing opponents in check, and 
may well be threatening the continuity of the project in the medium term. 
5. Conclusions: chances, limits and contradictions of state 
capitalism in Brazil and Argentina? 
What are the conclusions that can be drawn from the historically embedded analysis of 
emergence and constitution of the neodevelopmentalist projects in Brazil and Argentina 
and the empirical evaluation of their economic and social performance for an assessment 
of neodevelopmentalism and state capitalism more broadly? 
Generally, for both Brazil and Argentina, the return to state-centred strategies has 
brought about rather positive economic and social results, compared to their neoliberal-
inspired predecessors. Nevertheless, neodevelopmentalism in the two countries also 
shows significant differences, consistent with the respective historical legacies which the 
particular variants of the ‘old’ developmentalism and of economic neoliberalisation had 
left. On the one hand, Brazil’s PT governments have been more successful at attaining 
specific goals associated with neodevelopmentalist thought, such as fostering some (if 
limited) technological upgrading and the internationalisation of domestic firms, as well as 
maintaining the political stability of their project. The Kirchnerist administrations in Ar-
gentina, on the other hand, while less successful in neodevelopmentalist terms, have nev-
ertheless presided over a phase of extraordinary economic growth and considerable social 
improvements which have led to a recuperation of the country’s historically relatively 
high income and low inequality levels. 
In theoretical terms, these findings support the scepticism with which critical political 
economists view the faith neodevelopmentalists vest into a purportedly neutral and inde-
pendent state as chief motor for economic and social progress. While the social improve-
ments which Lula’s and Dilma’s governments have achieved are noteworthy in the con-
text of the highly exclusionary and unequal character of Brazil’s political economy, they 
do by no means signal a rupture with the latter. Rather, the stability of Brazilian neode-
velopmentalism comes at the price of limiting its democratic and social ambitions. The 
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greater social achievements of the Kirchner and Fernández administrations, in turn, are 
due to the greater role which social and labour mobilisation has played in the societal bloc 
supporting Kirchnerism. Tellingly, the class contradictions inherent to the capitalist mode 
of production are presently much more obvious in Argentina, as growing opposition by 
traditional economic elites coupled with an erosion of the government’s popular support 
base render the very political continuity of neodevelopmentalism increasingly questiona-
ble. 
Finally, the analysis has shown that the neodevelopmentalist projects in Brazil and 
Argentina remain firmly set within the parameters of dependent development. Despite 
their indubitable successes in some areas, the global insertion of both countries’ eco-
nomies continues to be marked by a dependence on primary and low-technology ex-
ports and a dominant role played by foreign TNCs in the leading segments of the local 
economy, among other factors. This is also reflected in the significant and growing so-
cio-ecological problems of the economic strategies of both Brazil and Argentina. In 
sum, neodevelopmentalist state capitalism in these countries seems to be far from bridg-
ing the various structural contradictions inscribed into the capitalist mode of produc-
tion. 
Notes 
 
1 Bresser-Pereira is a former national minister of Brazil, having occupied diverse positions within the Sar-
ney and Cardoso administrations, and is now, as an emeritus professor at Sao Paulo’s Getulio Vargas 
Foundation, one of the key intellectuals associated with Latin American neo-developmentalism. 
2 Data for comparison from CEPAL Cepalstat, URL http://websie.eclac.cl/infest/ajax/cepalstat.asp?  
carpeta=estadisticas, indicator Salario mínimo real. 
3 Probably the most striking case was Roussef’s forcing-out of the chief executive of the huge mining com-
pany Vale, the only the only Brazilian firm in UNCTAD’s 2011 global top-100 non-financial TNC list 
(Ban 2013). 
4 See section 3, below, for some notes on the dispute regarding their accuracy. Data from CEPAL Cepalstat, 
URL http://websie.eclac.cl/infest/ajax/cepalstat.asp?carpeta=estadisticas, indicator Salario mínimo real. 
5 Authors’ calculations based on data provided by CEPAL Cepalstat, URL http://websie.eclac.cl/infest/ajax/ 
cepalstat.asp?carpeta=estadisticas, indicators Participación en el producto interno bruto (PIB) anual por 
actividad económica a precios constantes and Tasa de crecimiento del producto interno bruto (PIB) anual 
por actividad económica a precios constantes. 
6 Data from CEPAL’s Base de Datos Estadísticos de Comercio Exterior (BADECEL), URL http://websie. 
eclac.cl/badecel/badecel_new/basededatos.asp; classification of goods according to the UN’s International 
Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC, third revision), and of technology intensity according to the 
OECD’s STAN indicators. 
7 Data from UNCTAD’s World Investment Reports 2004 and 2011 and the Unctadstat database, URL 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/. 
8 Data from Argentina’s national statistics authority Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos de la 
República Argentina (INDEC), http://www.indec.mecon.ar/principal.asp?id_tema=730. 
9 Data from UNCTAD’s World Investment Reports 2004 and 2011 and the Unctadstat database, URL 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/. 
10 Regional estimates for 2007 by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG, 2009). 
11 Data from UNCTAD’s Unctadstat database, URL http://unctadstat.unctad.org/. 
12 1990 data for Argentina is for 1991; 2000 data for Brazil is for 1999. 
13 Data from CEPAL Cepalstat, URL http://websie.eclac.cl/infest/ajax/cepalstat.asp?carpeta=estadisticas, 
indicator Salario medio real anual. 
14 Data from CEPAL Cepalstat, URL http://websie.eclac.cl/infest/ajax/cepalstat.asp?carpeta=estadisticas, 
indicator Tasa de desempleo abierto urbano. 
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15 Data from CEPAL Cepalstat, URL http://websie.eclac.cl/infest/ajax/cepalstat.asp?carpeta=estadisticas, 
indicator Ocupados urbanos en sectores de baja productividad (sector informal) del mercado de trabajo. 
16 World Bank World Development Indicators, URL http://data.worldbank.org., indicators GINI coefficient 
and Poverty headcount ratio at $2 per day (PPP). 
17 See the recent issues of the Informes de Coyuntura, prepared by the Observatorio Social de América Lati-
na (OSAL), a specialised body of the Latin American Social Sciences Council (CLACSO), available at 
URL http://www.clacso.org.ar/institucional/1h1.php. 
18 Data from ILO Labour statistics LABORSTA, http://laborsta.ilo.org/, indicators Strikes and lockouts and 
Rate of days not worked per 1,000 workers. 
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